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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
 In 1983, a state court jury convicted Joseph Kindler of 
killing a witness against him and recommended a sentence of 
death.  Following his trial, but before the death sentence had 
been formally imposed, Kindler filed several post-verdict 
motions.  Before those motions could be heard, Kindler 
escaped from custody, was captured, escaped again, and was 
finally arrested and returned to Philadelphia in 1991.  
Kindler's efforts to reinstate his post-verdict motions upon his 
return were unsuccessful, and his judgment of conviction was 
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thereafter affirmed, based on Pennsylvania's fugitive 
forfeiture doctrine.  Commonwealth v. Kindler, 639 A.2d 1, 3 
(Pa. 1994) ("Kindler I"); Commonwealth v. Kindler, 722 A.2d 
143, 146-48 (Pa. 1998) ("Kindler II").  On review of his 
petition for habeas relief, we agreed with the District Court 
that the state's forfeiture rule did not provide an adequate 
basis to bar federal habeas review.  Kindler v. Horn, 291 F. 
Supp. 2d 323, 343, 351 (E.D. Pa. 2003) ("Kindler III"); 
Kindler v. Horn, 542 F.3d 70, 78-80 (3d Cir. 2008) ("Kindler 
IV").  After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated 
our decision and remanded the case, concluding that a state 
procedural rule is not automatically inadequate and 
unenforceable just because the state rule is discretionary 
rather than mandatory.  Beard v. Kindler, 130 S. Ct. 612, 618 
(2009) ("Kindler V").  Kindler now argues on remand that 
Pennsylvania did not apply a discretionary rule, but, instead, 
applied a mandatory rule that represented a break from past 
decisions.  We agree and, for the following reasons, we will 
affirm in part and reverse in part the District Court's order. 
I. 
 Kindler's case is well-known.  In 1982 he burglarized a 
store in Pennsylvania with Scott Shaw and David Bernstein 
and was captured by the police.  He escaped.  Meanwhile, 
Bernstein fingered Kindler as the mastermind of the burglary 
and offered to testify against both Kindler and Shaw.  Kindler 
was then arrested and released on bail.  While out on bail he 
devised and carried out a plan to prevent Bernstein from 
testifying.  Working with Shaw's girlfriend, Michelle Raifer, 
Kindler lured Bernstein from his apartment, brutally struck 
him over the head twenty times with a baseball bat, jabbed 
him five times in the ribs with an electric prod, dragged 
Bernstein's immobilized body into Raifer's car, and drove to 
the banks of the Delaware River, where Kindler wrapped a 
cinder block around Bernstein's neck and threw him into the 
water.  
 A jury found Kindler guilty of murder and 
recommended a death sentence.  Afterwards, Kindler filed 
post-verdict motions in which he argued, among other things, 
(1) that the instructions given to the jury created a reasonable 
likelihood that, when deciding on whether to recommend the 
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death penalty, the jury believed it could only consider 
mitigating circumstances if those circumstances were 
unanimously agreed upon and (2) that the prosecutor had 
engaged in misconduct by improperly vouching for the 
evidence against him.  While those motions were pending, on 
September 19, 1984, Kindler organized an effort to saw 
through the external bars of his prison, escaped, and fled to 
Canada.  Approximately seven months later, he was arrested, 
once again, for burglary.  Once again, he was imprisoned.  
And, once again, he escaped, this time through an organized 
effort in which Kindler's fellow inmates hoisted him up to the 
roof through a skylight, where he rappelled down the side of 
the prison using a rope made of bed sheets.  A fugitive for 
two more years, Kindler was finally identified by Canadian 
viewers of the television program "America's Most Wanted" 
and arrested in September 1988.  He contested extradition and 
was not returned to Pennsylvania until September 16, 1991. 
 Kindler returned to find that, at the request of the 
Commonwealth, the trial judge had dismissed his post-verdict 
motions on account of his escape.  Kindler filed a motion to 
reinstate those motions.  In an oral ruling, the Court of 
Common Pleas denied the motion, finding that "the defendant 
did voluntarily remove himself from the Detention Center by 
escaping and loses all rights and privileges for post-trial 
motions." S.A. 63.  In October 1991, Kindler's death sentence 
was formally imposed.  On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court affirmed the trial judge's decision to deny his motion to 
reinstate his post-verdict motions, first explaining that the 
general rule in Pennsylvania at the time was that fugitives 
have "no right to any appellate review" and then crafting a 
new rule barring appellate review if (1) the defendant's flight 
has a connection to the court's ability to rule on the 
defendant's case and (2) the sanction of dismissing the 
defendant's appeal is reasonable under the circumstances.  
Kindler I, 639 A.2d at 3. 
Kindler then filed for relief under Pennsylvania's Post-
Conviction Relief Act (the "PCRA"), 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 9541 et 
seq. (West 2007), arguing, among other things, that counsel 
was constitutionally ineffective at the death penalty phase of 
his trial.  The PCRA court denied his petition and the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed, each concluding that 
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Kindler had no right to PCRA review because the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court had previously ruled that 
Kindler forfeited his right to an appeal by escaping.  Kindler 
II, 722 A.2d at 146-48. 
Kindler then turned to the federal courts for habeas 
relief.  The District Court concluded that the state fugitive 
forfeiture rule used to dismiss Kindler's post-trial motions 
was inadequate to bar federal review because it was not 
"clearly established" that Pennsylvania courts were required 
to dismiss a fugitive's appeals in situations where the fugitive 
had fled and been captured before the appellate process was 
ever initiated.  After finding constitutional errors in the 
penalty phase of his trial, the District Court issued an order 
granting in part and denying in part Kindler's Petition for Writ 
of Habeas Corpus.  Kindler III, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 343, 351-
52 (E.D. Pa. 2003).  On appeal, we agreed that the rule is 
inadequate and, upon reviewing the merits, affirmed the 
District Court's order granting habeas relief on Kindler's 
claim that the jury instructions violated the Supreme Court's 
decision in Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988) and 
reversed the District Court's order denying habeas relief on 
Kindler's claims that his counsel was constitutionally 
ineffective and that he was the victim of prosecutorial 
misconduct.  Kindler IV, 542 F.3d at 72.  
The Supreme Court then granted certiorari to decide 
whether "a state procedural rule [is] automatically 
'inadequate' under the adequate-state-grounds doctrine—and 
therefore unenforceable on federal habeas review—because 
the  state rule is discretionary rather than mandatory."  
Kindler V, 130 S. Ct. at 614-15.  During the oral argument in 
the Supreme Court, the parties agreed that the answer to this 
question was "no." Transcript of Oral Argument at 29-31, 
Kindler V, 130 S. Ct. 612 (2009)(No. 08-992).  The Supreme 
Court thus held that "a discretionary rule can serve as an 
adequate ground to bar federal habeas review."  Kindler V, 
130 S. Ct. at 618.  The court vacated our judgment and 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.  
With the Supreme Court's holding in mind, we are once again 
asked by the parties to determine whether Pennsylvania's 
fugitive forfeiture rule, as applied to Kindler's case, is 
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inadequate, and therefore unenforceable on federal habeas 
review.      
II. 
 In its ruling, the Supreme Court stated that the test for 
determining whether a rule is adequate is whether that rule is 
"firmly established and regularly followed."  Walker v. 
Martin, 131 S. Ct. 1120, 1127 (2011) (quoting Kindler V, 130 
S.Ct. at 617-18) .  Adequacy in this case is determined 
according to the law in effect when Kindler escaped from 
prison on September 19, 1984.  See Doctor v. Walters, 96 
F.3d 675, 684 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Reynolds v. Ellingsworth, 
843 F.2d 712, 722 (3d Cir. 1988)). 
The purpose of the adequacy doctrine is twofold:  to 
ensure that state courts do not set traps for unwary litigants 
bringing disfavored claims, and to ensure that habeas 
petitioners have fair notice of what they must do to avoid 
default.  Campbell v. Burris, 515 F.3d 172, 179 (3d Cir. 
2008).  "In applying these principles, this Court seeks to 
determine whether the state rule itself provides guidance 
regarding how the rule should be applied or whether such 
standards have developed in practice."  Id. (citing Doctor, 96 
F.3d at 684-85).  A state procedural rule consistently applied 
in the majority of cases, but occasionally overlooked in 
others, may nevertheless be adequate.  Doctor, 96 F.3d at 684 
(citing Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 410 n.6 (1989)).  
Thus, as we explained in the course of enforcing a state 
equivalent of the federal plain error rule in Campbell, 
[t]he issue is not whether the state procedural 
default rule leaves room for the exercise of 
some judicial discretion – almost all do.  
Rather, the issue is whether, at the relevant 
point in time, the judicial discretion 
contemplated by the state rule is being 
exercised in a manner that lets people know 
when they are at risk of default and treats 
similarly-situated people in the same manner. 
515 F.3d at 181.   
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The trial court ruled that the fugitive forfeiture rule 
was mandatory, i.e., that it was required to dismiss Kindler's 
post-verdict motions.  S.A. 58 (order granting 
Commonwealth's motion to dismiss Kindler's motions "by 
reason of his escape from lawful custody and current status as 
a fugitive from justice."); S.A. 63 (oral ruling that "the 
defendant did voluntarily remove himself from the Detention 
Center by escaping and loses all rights and privileges for 
post-trial motions"(emphasis added)); S.A. 73 (opinion noting 
that the original trial court judge was applying Pennsylvania 
Superior Court precedent stating that he was "without 
discretion in denying defendant's post-verdict motions as long 
as he remained a fugitive outside the court's jurisdiction" 
(emphasis added)).  But the same court also believed that it 
had the discretion to reinstate those motions upon Kindler's 
return to custody.  S.A. 74 (opinion describing the standard 
for review of the denial of a motion to reinstate post-trial 
motions as "whether the trial court abused its discretion").   
Thus, the fugitive forfeiture rule, as articulated by the 
trial court judges in Kindler's case, mandated that his motions 
be dismissed, but gave them discretion to reinstate those 
motions if Kindler asked them to upon his recapture.  This 
curious mix of obligation and discretion created the confusion 
that has plagued this case—a state that was compounded 
when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court subsequently set forth 
the entirely new rule that appellate court review of post-trial 
motions dismissed on account of a defendant's status as a 
fugitive is limited to whether the sanction of dismissal is 
reasonable under the circumstances.  Kindler I, 639 A.3d at 3. 
 We have previously concluded that there was no 
firmly established fugitive forfeiture rule mandating the 
dismissal of an appeal first filed upon a fugitive's return to 
custody.  See Doctor, 96 F.3d at 685-86.  In that case, 
defendant Gary Lee Doctor escaped during the lunch recess 
of his bench trial for the crime of aggravated assault.  Upon 
his recapture five years later, Doctor filed an appeal to the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court.  That court dismissed the 
appeal, explaining that by choosing to flee, "Doctor forever 
forfeited his right to appeal."  Id. at 684.  We understood this 
language to indicate that the Superior Court believed it had no 
discretion to consider Doctor's appeal. 
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 Then we surveyed the relevant Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court decisions to determine whether this was a new rule.   In 
Commonwealth v. Galloway, 333 A.2d 741 (1975), the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania addressed a situation in 
which the defendant had escaped twice – once during the 
pendency of post-trial motions in the trial court and again 
during the pendency of an appeal to the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania.  Following his initial escape, the trial court 
dismissed his motions pursuant to the fugitive forfeiture 
doctrine.  After his return to custody and sentencing, the 
defendant appealed.  When the defendant escaped again, the 
Commonwealth moved to dismiss the appeal.  The defendant 
returned to custody, however, before the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court acted on the Commonwealth’s motion.  The 
Court denied the motion, explaining: 
The rationale behind dismissal of an appeal 
while a convicted defendant is a fugitive from 
justice rests upon the inherent discretion of any 
court to refuse to hear the claim of a litigant 
who, by escaping, has placed himself beyond 
the jurisdiction and control of the court, and, 
hence, might not be responsive to the judgment 
of the court. 
. . . Since Galloway is no longer a 
fugitive from justice and is now subject to the 
jurisdiction of this Court, he will be responsive 
to any judgment this Court renders.  Therefore, 
this Court has no basis upon which to grant a 
motion to dismiss the appeal at this juncture. 
Id. at 743 (citations omitted). 
 While the Galloway Court did not fault the trial court 
for dismissing the post-trial motions, the absence of rulings 
on them did not preclude judicial review.   It ruled: 
 In order to give the trial court the first 
opportunity to rectify any errors that may have 
occurred in the trial process, and to aid in 
clarifying and framing the issues on appeal, we 
remand the record to the trial court for 
disposition of the post-trial motions on the 
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merits.  See Commonwealth v. Grillo, 208 
Pa.Super. 444, 449 n.1, 222 A.2d 427, 430 n.1 
(1966).  Upon remand the trial court is directed 
to consider the issues raised in the ―motions‖ 
filed January 17, 1973. 
Id. 
 ―After Galloway, Pennsylvania’s intermediate courts 
consistently recognized their discretion to hear a properly 
filed appeal as long as the criminal defendant had returned to 
the jurisdiction before the appeal was dismissed.‖  Doctor, 96 
F.3d at 685.  Thus, in Doctor we concluded that the rule at the 
time of Doctor's escape was as follows:  "if the defendant is 
returned to custody while his appeal is pending, an appellate 
court has the discretion to hear the appeal, but if the 
defendant is returned to custody after the appeal is dismissed 
an appellate court lacks the discretion to reinstate and hear the 
appeal."  Id.  Because Doctor's case presented a new 
situation—he escaped before the appellate process had even 
begun—we concluded that "it was not 'firmly established' that 
Pennsylvania courts lacked the discretion to hear an appeal 
first filed after custody had been restored."  Id at 686.   
 Both Kindler and Doctor were subjected to a 
mandatory rule that stymied their appeals.  When the question 
of adequacy was presented to us previously, we were thus 
confronted with the sub-question whether the differences 
between Kindler's case and Doctor's were legally relevant.  
We concluded that they were not.  The procedural default rule 
applied in Kindler’s case was not only not firmly established 
in 1984 but was directly inconsistent with Pennsylvania law 
at that time as reflected in Galloway.  It follows that the rule 
did not treat Kindler in the same manner as similarly situated 
individuals would have been treated in Pennsylvania in 1984.  
Accordingly, we held that Pennsylvania’s fugitive forfeiture 
rule did not preclude us from reaching the merits of this 
habeas proceeding.
1
  Now, on remand, we must determine 
                                              
1
 Contrary to the suggestion of the Commonwealth, 
Commonwealth v. Passaro, 476 A.2d 346 (Pa. 1984), does 
not support a contrary conclusion.  As we noted in our prior 
opinion, Passaro holds only that when an appellate court has 
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whether the Supreme Court's opinion compels a different 
result. 
III. 
 The Supreme Court's review of our prior decision 
resulted in what it described as a "narrow" holding in 
response to a "narrow" question of federal habeas law.  
Kindler V, 130 S. Ct. at 619.  It held that a discretionary rule 
can be adequate to bar federal habeas review and then 
expressly left it to us to decide, on remand, whether the 
Pennsylvania courts applied a "new rule mandating 
dismissal," which "constituted a break from past discretionary 
practice."  Id.  We so decide.  Here, just as in Doctor, a 
mandatory rule was not firmly established and was thus 
inadequate to bar federal review.  Our holding in both cases 
was in no way dependent on a conclusion that discretionary 
rules are automatically inadequate.  To the contrary, we held 
in our prior decision that the rigid, mandatory, rule requiring 
dismissal of post-verdict motions was inadequate because it 
was novel.  Kindler IV, 542 F.3d at 80.  Because the Supreme 
Court's opinion leaves our prior holding undisturbed, we 
reaffirm our prior decision. 
 The Commonwealth protests.  It points out that after 
confirming that the general rule was mandatory, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court distinguished Kindler's case, 
applied a new, discretionary, rule and then used that rule as 
the basis for refusing to hear the merits of Kindler's appeal.  
However, we must look at the law as it was understood at the 
time of Kindler's escape.  See Doctor, 96 F.3d at 684 (citing 
Reynolds v. Ellingsworth, 843 F.2d 712, 722 (3d Cir. 1988) 
                                                                                                     
dismissed an appeal under the fugitive forfeiture rule in the 
defendant’s absence, it lacks discretion to reinstate the appeal 
when the defendant is returned to custody.  ―Galloway . . . 
underscores a critical distinction between dismissed post-
verdict motions and a dismissed final appeal.  That distinction 
arises from the fact that after an appeal is dismissed, a court 
no longer retains jurisdiction.  However, appellate courts can 
exercise jurisdiction after post-verdict motions are dismissed, 
and they therefore can exercise discretion to hear the claims 
of defendant's appeal.‖  Kindler IV, 542 F. 3d at 79.   
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(citing Spencer v. Kemp, 781 F.2d 1458, 1469 (11th Cir. 
1986)(en banc) and Lumpkin v. Ricketts, 551 F.2d 680, 682 & 
n.2 (5th Cir. 1977))).  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court was 
applying a new rule in Kindler's case.  This rule obviously did 
not exist in 1984 and was thus not "firmly established." 
 Moreover, the rule applied to bar Kindler's appeal was 
hardly discretionary in the usual sense of the term.  The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that its review of the 
trial court's decision to dismiss the post-verdict motions was 
"limited to determining whether the flight has a connection 
with the court's ability to dispose [of] the defendant's case and 
whether the sanction imposed in response to the flight is 
reasonable under the circumstances."  Kindler I, 639 A.2d at 
3.  This amounts to a mandatory rule with narrow conditions.  
Worse, in Kindler's case the new rule announced by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court sharply and suddenly skewed 
the rules in the Commonwealth's favor because the trial court 
judges applied a mandatory rule to dismiss Kindler's post-
verdict motions, even though one of those judges thought "the 
better practice would have been to consider the post-verdict 
motions, particularly in light of the death sentence imposed."  
S.A. 74.  Once that initial decision had been made by the trial 
court, imposing a new appellate standard of review sharply 
deferential to the trial court's determination simply served to 
reinforce the mandatory, and inadequate, fugitive forfeiture 
rule. 
 The Commonwealth also asserts that the Supreme 
Court's holding in this matter encompasses the broad 
proposition that a rule can be adequate, even if its contours 
are still being developed on a case-by-case basis through the 
methodology of the common law and even if it is announced 
for the first time in a defendant's particular case.  We 
disagree.  The Supreme Court stated and applied its standard 
for adequacy—a rule is adequate if "firmly established and 
regularly followed"—and expressly declined the 
Commonwealth's invitation to craft a new standard.  Kindler 
V, 130 S.Ct. at 617-619; Walker 121 S. Ct. at 1127.  Under 
this long-existing standard, a state court decision applying "a 
rule unannounced at the time of petitioner's trial"—like the 
mandatory rule applied to bar Kindler's appeal—is 
inadequate.  Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 424 (1991).  See 
12 
 
also Walker, 121 S. Ct. at 1130 ("[F]ederal courts must 
carefully examine state procedural requirements to ensure that 
they do not operate to discriminate against claims of federal 
rights."). 
 The Commonwealth's final argument is that, under the 
Supreme Court's holding, Pennsylvania's fugitive forfeiture 
rule is adequate because it mirrors the federal fugitive 
forfeiture rule.  In its opinion, the Supreme Court stated that 
"[t]he States seem to value discretionary rules as much as the 
Federal Government does," and then remarked that "it would 
seem particularly strange to disregard state procedural rules 
that are substantially similar to those to which we give full 
force in our own courts."  Kindler V, 130 S.Ct. at 618.  But 
these sentences did not impose a new standard requiring 
lower courts to first compare state rules to their federal 
equivalents and then find them adequate if they are 
"substantially similar."  The standard remains whether the 
state rule is firmly established and regularly applied.   
 In short, we find the Commonwealth's position 
unpersuasive.  In time, the Supreme Court may reconsider its 
standard for determining adequacy.  But that time has not yet 
arrived and we are constrained, both by the existing standard 
requiring that adequate rules be firmly established and 
regularly followed and by our holding in Doctor. 
IV. 
 The rule of procedure applied to Kindler's case, which 
mandated the dismissal of an appeal based on the claims 
raised in his post-verdict motions, was a new rule that was not 
firmly established at the time of his escape.  Accordingly, that 
bar is unenforceable on habeas review.  We thus reaffirm our 
prior decision.  In that decision, we reviewed the merits of 
Kindler's petition and concluded, among other things, (1) that 
the jury instructions and verdict sheet used during the penalty 
phase of his trial denied him due process of law pursuant to 
the Supreme Court's holding in Mills and (2) that Kindler was 
denied effective assistance of counsel during the penalty 
phase. 
 The order of the district court granting a conditional 
writ of habeas corpus and ordering either a new sentencing 
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hearing within 180 days or a sentence of life imprisonment is 
thus affirmed. 
KINDLER v. HORN --  Nos. 03-9010 and 03-9011 
 
STAPLETON, J., concurring: 
 I concur in the judgment of the Court because Kindler 
was denied appellate review to which he would have been 
entitled under the law of Pennsylvania as reflected in 
Commonwealth v. Galloway, 333 A.2d 741 (1975), at the 
time of his escape. 
 
 Having once again focused on the Pennsylvania case 
law in 1984, I also conclude that the rule applied by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Kindler’s case was not firmly 
established and regularly followed at that time for an 
additional reason - Pennsylvania’s “relaxed waiver rule” for 
capital cases. 
 
 When Kindler escaped in 1984, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court had issued four opinions in which it had 
applied the relaxed waiver rule.  See Commonwealth v. 
Stoyko, 475 A.2d 714 (Pa. 1984); Commonwealth v. Frey, 
475 A.2d 700 (Pa. 1984);  Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 454 
A.2d 937 (Pa. 1982); Commonwealth v. McKenna, 383 A.2d 
174 (Pa. 1978).  That relaxed waiver rule was first invoked by 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in a 1978 case, 
Commonwealth v. McKenna.  There, McKenna was convicted 
of first degree murder and rape and was sentenced to death 
for the murder conviction.  On direct appeal, McKenna 
challenged his conviction but refused to allow his attorney to 
raise any challenge to the constitutionality of the death 
sentence because he preferred the death penalty to life 
imprisonment.  Amicus curiae, however, filed briefs 
challenging the constitutionality of the death penalty statute 
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under which McKenna was sentenced.  Although the issue of 
the death penalty statute’s constitutionality was explicitly 
waived by McKenna, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
declined to apply usual waiver rules and find that McKenna 
had waived the issue of the statute’s constitutionality. 
 
 The Court based its decision to reach the constitutional 
claim “expressly” waived by McKenna on the sentence 
imposed - death - and the public interest in preventing 
unconstitutional executions.  The Court explained:  
 
We recognize . . . that the doctrine 
of waiver is, in our adversary 
system of litigation, indispensable 
to the orderly functioning of the 
judicial process. There are, 
however, occasional rare 
situations where an appellate 
court must consider the interests 
of society as a whole in seeing to 
it that justice is done, regardless 
of what might otherwise be the 
normal procedure. One such 
situation is surely the imposition 
of capital punishment. That this is 
a unique penalty requiring special 
jurisprudential treatment is a 
concept now embodied in the 
statutory law of this 
Commonwealth. . . .  This is 
illustrative of a general 
proposition that while a defendant 
may normally make an informed 
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and voluntary waiver of rights 
personal to himself, his freedom 
to do so must give way where a 
substantial public policy is 
involved; in such a case an 
appeals court may feel fully 
warranted in seeking to reach an 
issue. We have no doubt that this 
is such a case. Because imposition 
of the death penalty is irrevocable 
in its finality, it is imperative that 
the standards by which that 
sentence is fixed be 
constitutionally beyond reproach.  
. . . .  
The waiver rule cannot be exalted 
to a position so lofty as to require 
this Court to blind itself to the real 
issue the propriety of allowing the 
state to conduct an illegal 
execution of a citizen.  
 
In short, where an overwhelming 
public interest is involved but is 
not addressed by the parties, the 
Court has a duty to transcend 
procedural rules which are not, in 
spirit, applicable, to the end that 
the public interest may be 
vindicated. Such an 
overwhelming interest insuring 
that capital punishment in this 
Commonwealth comports with 
4 
 
the Constitution of the United 
States is present here.   
  
McKenna, 383 A.2d at 180-81 (citations and footnotes 
omitted) (emphases added).   The Court thus declined to 
apply ordinary waiver rules in McKenna’s case, found the 
death penalty statute unconstitutional, and remanded for 
resentencing. 
 
  Four years later, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
again addressed the issue of waiver in a capital case.  See 
Zettlemoyer, 454 A.2d at 937.  There, Zettlemoyer was 
convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death.  In 
his appeal, Zettlemoyer argued, inter alia, that the trial court 
erred by allowing the Commonwealth to read the indictments 
of another criminal proceeding to the jury.  The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court observed that the argument was waived 
because it was not raised in post-verdict motions.  
Nevertheless, relying on McKenna, the Court addressed the 
issue on the merits, explaining that it would “not adhere 
strictly to [its] normal rules of waiver.”  Id. at 955 n.19.  
Again, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained its 
application of the relaxed waiver rule as based on the nature 
of the sentence at issue. 
 
 In two cases decided less than six months before 
Kindler escaped, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court again 
applied the relaxed waiver rule in capital cases.  In both, the 
Court cited Zettlemoyer in support of its decision not to find 
waiver and offered no significant alteration of the rule as 
announced in McKenna and Zettlemoyer.   
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 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court continued to apply 
the relaxed waiver rule in capital cases on collateral review 
until 1998 and on direct review until 2001.  Although it is not 
decisive with regard to determining the established law as of 
1984, it is notable that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
thereafter continued to explain the relaxed waiver rule as 
having been “created to prevent [the Court] from being 
instrumental in an unconstitutional execution.”  See 
Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 720 A.2d 693, 700 (Pa. 1998).  
As of 1984, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had 
already explicitly and repeatedly stated that its relaxation of 
its traditional appellate rules in death penalty cases was based 
on the nature of penalty involved and on the public interest in 
avoiding unconstitutional executions.  Accordingly, it is not 
surprising that this Court has held that, as of 1981, “McKenna 
. . . rather firmly established that a claim of constitutional 
error in a capital case would not be waived by a failure to 
preserve it.”  Suzchon v. Lehman, 273 F.3d 299, 326 (3d Cir. 
2001). 
 
 As of 1984, the relaxed waiver rule was applied in 
Pennsylvania to any constitutional claim of any defendant 
facing the death penalty, and it was not firmly established that 
a specific type of waiver - fugitive forfeiture - would cause a 
Pennsylvania court to decline to apply that rule.    
